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When David Satcher, M.D., Ph.D., issued Mental
Health: A Report of the Surgeon General on December
13, 1999, some commentators remembered earlier
surgeon generals’ reports and their effect on public
policy, particularly the first report which launched the
nation’s campaign against smoking in 1964. In a front
page article the next day, Robert Pear of the New York
Times commented: “The report is significant because it
meticulously analyzes huge amounts of data and puts the
imprimatur of the government on the findings, just as the
surgeon general’s report on smoking and health did in
1964.”1 The latest report was the 50th since the report on
smoking but the first to deal with issues in the area of
mental health. (Twenty-eight of the earlier Surgeon
Generals’ reports had addressed tobacco issues.) In
many ways, it is not surprising that it has taken so long
to turn to this area of health policy, since it has not been
unusual for health policymakers to give mental health
wide berth. To many health policy experts, the area of
mental health has seemed alien, dealing as it does with
separate systems of services, including psychology,
social services, housing, and income support.
Yet, among the key findings of the report issued by
Satcher is one he highlighted at the press conference on
December 13: “There’s no scientific reason to differentiate between mental health and other kinds of health.
Mental illnesses are physical illnesses.” The report is
the result of a review of more than 3,000 research
monographs and thus rests on a solid foundation of
state-of-the-art science in the area of mental health. The
Washington Post reported on December 14: “[Satcher]
said he hoped the report would have the lasting impact
of the initial report on smoking, but that it would ‘be
more effective than the smoking report in terms of
actually changing how people lived.’”
The purpose of this background paper is to review
the report in terms of the political, historical, economic,
and attitudinal forces which have shaped mental health
policy in the United States while highlighting the
findings of the report that have the most salience from a
federal policy perspective. While the report itself and its
executive summary are clear, informative documents,
they are written for a broad audience, and the overall
length of the report—almost 500 pages—may inhibit
some policymakers from reviewing the entire document.

KEY FINDINGS, DEFINITIONS, AND
SCOPE OF THE REPORT
The report makes a number of key findings, which
might be summarized as follows:








Mental illnesses are devastatingly real and affect
roughly one in five Americans in the course of a
year.
The diagnosis and treatment of mental illness are
grounded on a scientific basis that is as strong as
that for the diagnosis and treatment of nonmental or
physical illness.
The stigma associated with mental illness is irrational but a major factor in impeding the needed
treatment of Americans with mental illness.
Especially in a period of managed care ascendancy,
there is no rationale for a lack of parity in insurance
coverage between mental health and physical health.
Americans do not have equal access to mental health
care. Income, race, and ethnicity are significant factors
inhibiting equal access.
The report also offers several basic definitions:





Mental illness refers to all diagnosable mental disorders. Mental disorders are health conditions that are
characterized by alterations in thinking, mood, or
behavior (or some combination thereof) associated
with distress and/or impaired functioning.2
Mental health problems [are] signs and symptoms of
insufficient intensity or duration to meet the criteria
for any mental disorder. . . . Bereavement symptoms
in older adults [of short duration—less than two
months] offer a case in point.

In terms of scope, the report explicitly omits discussion of developmental disabilities (such as mental
retardation, cerebral palsy, and autism) and addictive
disorders (such as alcoholism and drug abuse), with the
exception of dual diagnoses of mental illness and
chemical dependency.

CONTEXT
To fully appreciate the potential impact of the report,
it is helpful to consider its political, historical, economic, and attitudinal context. Economists Richard
Frank and Thomas McGuire succinctly capsulize some
of the basic contextual differences between mental
health and general health:
In terms of public and private policy in the U.S., mental
illness and substance abuse are not treated the same as
other illnesses. In comparison to physical illness, government pays for more of mental health and substance
abuse care, and private insurance pays for less. . . . The
public system in mental health has a role as protector of
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public safety. When efforts have been made to reform
the health sector in the U.S., mental health and substance abuse are usually handled separately.3

Widespread Skepticism about Intervention
A major reason that mental health policymaking is
often segregated from health policymaking is a basic
skepticism about whether mental health interventions
have any effect—or, if they have an effect, whether it is
positive and cost-efficient. In his book on the history of
the treatment of people with mental illness in America,
Gerald Grob points out: “The prevailing image was that
psychiatric therapies were distinctly inferior to those
employed in general practice. That therapeutics in
general medical practice were no different from those in
psychiatry was all but ignored.”4 Popular caricatures of
people with mental illness and the treatment they
receive, typified by Woody Allen’s ridicule of his
lengthy time in psychotherapy, only reinforce this
attitude.
At least part of the reason for the skepticism about
how wisely funds are invested in various mental health
therapies is a sense that some portion of those receiving
such therapies do not in fact need them but are, at
worst, what is popularly characterized as “the worried
well,” people coping with the “normal” stresses of
everyday life.

Insurance Practices
The report itself comments on the way this skepticism affects insurance coverage of mental illness:
Private health insurance is generally more restrictive
in coverage of mental illness than in coverage for
somatic illness. This was motivated by several concerns. Insurers feared that coverage of mental health
services would result in high costs associated with
long-term and intensive psychotherapy and extended
hospital stays. They were also reluctant to pay for
long-term, often custodial, hospital stays that were
guaranteed by the public mental health system, the
provider of “catastrophic care.”

Two terms—moral hazard and adverse selection—are frequently applied to describe the special
fears of insurers about covering mental illnesses. Moral
hazard describes a situation in which consumers’
demand for a good is highly sensitive to the price they
confront; in other words, in health coverage, the lower
the consumer’s out-of-pocket cost, the more of the good
will be consumed. It is generally accepted that demand
for mental health services—especially outpatient mental
health services—is more price-sensitive than demand
for other health services.

Adverse selection describes the apprehension of
insurers that if they offer generous, high-quality mental
health coverage, they will draw a group of enrollees
with a disproportionate amount of high-risk consumers
—people with mental illness will naturally gravitate to
the health plans that cover it best, it is theorized.
Commenting on the probability of adverse selection,
Frank and McGuire observe:
There is both direct and indirect evidence suggesting
that the mentally ill and substance abuse users [sic]
are associated with higher levels of health care spending and that they systematically select health plans
that offer more generous coverage for behavioral
health treatment.5

In some ways, the very use of such negative
terminology—moral hazard and adverse selection—
gives a negative overtone to policy discussions in this
area. Bruce Vladeck and his former HCFA colleagues
make this point when they comment:
Even the language in which policymakers characterize
the effects of coverage betray a fundamental bias
against the population for whom aid is provided. . . .
Offer a benefit, and a moral hazard exists that some
unworthy will advance to claim it. When the political
culture accepts a disability paradigm grounded in a
false conception of benefits users as unworthy or
immoral, it is difficult to see how the problem can be
impartially studied, let alone resolved.6

The point they make also seems applicable to the term
“adverse selection.”
Historically, especially in a fee-for-service context,
insurers have pursued a number of strategies to protect
themselves from what they see as the threat of potentially open-ended mental health expenditures. For one
thing, they have applied a number of seemingly arbitrary
limits to mental health benefits, such as number of days
of inpatient treatment, number of outpatient visits,
aggregate yearly and lifetime limits on insurance outlays, and high deductibles and copayments. Removing
such limits, which are seldom applied to coverage for
non–mental health benefits, has been the prime rationale
for the parity legislation which has now been enacted in
nearly 30 states as well as at the federal level through the
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-204).7
There is growing evidence that such limits, which
have always been seen as a rather “blunt instrument,” are
increasingly outmoded, as more and more Americans
receive their mental health coverage through managed
care arrangements. As the report points out: “In 1999,
almost 177 million Americans with health insurance (72
percent) were enrolled in managed behavioral health
organizations [MBHOs].” The MBHOs offer specialized
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coverage only for mental health and substance abuse,
allowing them to manage benefits in these areas very
rigorously. The 72 percent figure excludes other Americans who may be enrolled in managed care arrangements
in which behavioral health was still managed by a
general-purpose health maintenance organization (HMO)
or preferred provider organization (PPO).

indicates, the public system plays a residual or safety net
role in covering mental health expenses: “The public
sector serves particularly those individuals who have no
health insurance, those who have insurance but no mental
health coverage, and those who exhaust limited mental
health benefits in their health insurance.”

Under any managed care arrangement, the need for
such limits on visits, days, and expenditures is obviated by
the opportunity to make individual, case-by-case decisions on medical necessity, including whether coverage of
a benefit is appropriate for an individual and, if so, what
type and quantity of the benefit are covered. While the
apparent need for limits on benefits in managed care
contracts seems to have disappeared, they persist, especially in states without parity laws.8 Where they do, they
reflect in part a continued mind-set that mental health
benefits warrant restrictions that other benefits do not.

TABLE 1
Comparison of U.S. Spending on
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services
with Spending on All Health Care,
by Source of Payment, 1996
(in percent)
Mental Health/
Substance Abuse

All Health

Private insurance

25.8

31.0

Out-of-pocket

15.1

18.2

Other private

2.8

3.4

43.7

52.5

Medicaid*

18.9

14.8

Medicare

14.0

21.0

Other federal**

4.0

4.4

Other state/local

19.4

7.3

56.3

47.5

100.0

100.0

Private Payers

Third-Party Reimbursement for
Mental Health: Public versus Private
Private insurance plays a smaller role in reimbursing
behavioral health care costs than in all of health care
reimbursement—funding about 26 percent of mental
health and substance abuse costs in comparison to 31
percent of total health costs.9 Ohio Mental Health
Director Michael Hogan recently observed:
Behavioral disorders remain essentially the only set of
health problems for which state and local governments
finance and manage a specialty treatment system. . . .
The public mental health system is the only substantial,
disease-specific treatment system in existence today. . .
. States remain the largest single payer for mental health
care, if states’ contributions to Medicaid are considered.
.
Public spending covered 53 percent of all mental health
treatment costs. Private insurance payments . . . covered
only about a quarter of costs.10

It is widely believed that the very existence of this separate public system provides both employers and insurers
a ready excuse for offering people with private insurance
only limited coverage for mental health benefits. The
report concludes:
Existence of the public sector as a guarantor of
“catastrophic care” for the uninsured and underinsured allowed the private sector to avoid financial risk
and focus on acute care of less impaired individuals,
most of whom received health insurance benefits
through their employer.

Table 1 presents a comparison of the sources of payment
for services provided by the mental health/substance
abuse sector with those provided by the health system as
a whole in the United States in 1996. As the report

Total private
Public Payers

Total public
TOTAL

Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.
*Includes both federal and state Medicaid expenditures.
**Includes Veterans Administration, Department of Defense,
federal block grants.
Source: David McKusick, Tami L. Mark, Edward King, Rick
Harwood, Jeffrey A. Buck, Joan Dilonardo, and James S.
Genuardi, “Spending for Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Treatment 1996,” Health Affairs, 17, no. 5 (September/
October1998): 147-157.

Federalism and Mental Health Policy
While the role of the federal government in mental
health policy throughout American history has been
subordinate to that of the states, federal participation
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changed dramatically with the enactment of the Community Mental Health Centers Acts in 1963 and 1965
and the amendments to the Social Security Act of 1965,
which created Medicaid and Medicare. The report
points out:
Since the mid-1960s . . . the role of the Federal government has increased. In addition to Medicare and
Medicaid, the Federal government funds special
programs for adults with serious mental illness and
children with serious emotional disability. Although
small in relation to state and local funding, these
federal programs provide additional resources. They
include the Community Mental Health Block Grant,
Community Support programs, the PATH program for
people with mental illness who are homeless, the
Knowledge Development and Application Program,
and the Comprehensive Community Mental Health
Services for Children and Their Families Program.

As shown in Table 1, however, Medicare and Medicaid
are the dominant forces in federal behavioral health
spending, accounting for about eight times the share
provided by the federal programs which are more targeted
to behavioral health problems. (Medicaid expenditures
include state matching funds, which account for about 43
percent of total Medicaid spending.)
From the outset, both Medicaid and Medicare
included provisions that were designed to prevent the
states from utilizing either program as a means of
subsidizing what had previously been exclusively statelocal fiscal responsibilities for mental health services,
particularly in state mental hospitals (where reimbursement was governed by what these federal entitlement
programs called exclusions for “institutions for mental
disease” [IMDs]). But both programs were far less
restrictive in terms of coverage outside of institutional
boundaries. As Vladeck and his colleagues point out:
State mental hospitals were the mainstay of mental
health care in the years before the enactment of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, and both programs
had features designed to avoid paying for care in these
settings. . . . However, a gradual shift in the location of
mental health care from the states to the federal
government began in the 1960s and 1970s with
deinstitutionalization. Consequently, federal programs
have become increasingly important for chronically
mentally ill populations, first by default, as
deinstitutionalization proceeded, and then with the
expansion of entitlements to include SSI [Supplemental Security Income] and Medicaid benefits. This
“Medicaidization” of mental health, and the perception of a need to level the playing field by expanding
mental health services, is forcing consideration of
how policy should respond to mental illness.11

Medicaid coverage in the community offered a
special stimulus to deinstitutionalization insofar as Title
XIX offered coverage for the following services:







Nursing home care for elderly and chronically ill
patients, regardless of their diagnosis. (This led to
the transfer of large numbers of elderly mental
hospital patients to nursing homes.)
Inpatient psychiatric services in general community
hospitals. (Especially for patients with acute mental
illness, this led to a shift of locale of treatment from
state mental hospitals, as more and more general
hospitals created psychiatric units. By 1983, twothirds of episodes of mental illness were treated in
general hospitals.)
Rehabilitative services provided outside special
psychiatric settings.

While Medicaid reimbursed many of the medical
expenses of former mental patients living in the community, the Federal Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
programs paid for their essential living expenses such
as room and board. States have no financial obligation
for sharing in the costs of SSDI payments, although
they have the option of supplementing SSI grants.

Cost-Shifting among Payers
With all of these separate funding streams and
payers, it is not surprising that there is considerable
effort to shift costs across the mental health system.
Frank and McGuire describe mental health policy as a
“cascading cost-shifting game” in which each of “the
players across levels and within levels of the game
makes choices subject to rules set at a higher level.”12 In
a recent article in Health Affairs, David Mechanic and
Donna McAlpine of Rutgers University suggest the
implications of this cost-shifting for public mental
health policy: “Behavioral health care is an area in
which it is relatively easy to shift costs and responsibilities to other sectors, so boundaries have to be made
clear and transparent to monitoring efforts.”13

Obstacles to Access
In his preface to the report, Satcher makes a striking
statement: “Even more than other areas of health and
medicine, the mental health field is plagued by disparities in the availability of and access to its services.”
This is a telling observation in the context of 44 million
Americans who lack any health insurance and countless
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others who are underinsured. As pointed out above, the
report notes that nearly half of Americans with a severe
mental illness do not seek treatment and that almost
two-thirds of those with a diagnosable mental disorder
fail to seek treatment.
The report goes on to identify a number of major
obstacles to needed mental health services, including the
following:






Concerns about cost—obviously linked to inadequate third-party coverage.
Worry about stigma and public attitudes toward
mental illness.
Minimization of the mental illness or disorder,
sometimes linked to a belief that the problem will
resolve itself.
Lack of sensitivity to racial, ethnic, and other minorities on the part of a mental health delivery system
which is dominated by white, Anglo providers offering care based almost exclusively on a model of their
own racial group’s needs.

Stigma and Popular Attitudes toward
Mental Illness
The increase of knowledge about mental illness might
have been expected to dispel the stigma associated with it
in recent years, but the report notes that stigma has
actually increased over the past 40 years: “Why is stigma
so strong despite better public understanding of mental
illness? The answer appears to be fear of violence; people
with mental illness, especially those with psychosis, are
perceived to be more violent than in the past.” The report
indicates that a series of surveys found that “selective
media reporting reinforced the public’s stereotypes
linking violence and mental illness and encouraged
people to distance themselves from those with mental
disorders.” The cases of Andrew Goldstein, who pushed
Kendra Webdale under the wheels of an oncoming New
York subway train; Russell Weston, Jr., who shot and
killed two U.S. Capitol policemen; and the two teenaged
boys who shot members of the Columbine High School
community in Colorado before taking their own lives are
recent examples of such intense media attention.
The forces of deinstitutionalization, which have
reduced mental hospital populations and increased the
number of people who might formerly have been
institutionalized but are either receiving community
treatment or are homeless, have obviously increased
public awareness of people with mental illness. The

examples the public sees sometimes engage in bizarre
or threatening behavior, increasing both public discomfort and stigma. Stigmatization of mental illness prohibits all but a few public figures from disclosing their
mental illness in an attempt to educate the public—
reporter Mike Wallace, author William Styron, and
actress Patty Duke are among the few who have disclosed their conditions. It is perhaps noteworthy that
none is a politician and that the politicians who are
leaders in fighting for the rights of people with mental
illness are typically those with relatives with mental
illness—not consumers themselves.
The report responds to public fears of violence from
people with mental illness as follows:
The greatest risk of violence is from those who have
dual diagnoses, i.e., individuals who have a mental
disorder as well as a substance abuse disorder. There
is a small elevation in risk of violence from individuals with severe mental disorder (e.g., psychosis),
especially if they are noncompliant with their medication. Yet the risk of violence is much less for a
stranger than a family member or person who is
known to the person with mental illness. In fact, there
is very little risk of violence or harm from casual
contact with an individual who has a mental disorder. . . . To put this all in perspective, the overall
contribution of mental disorders to the total level of
violence in society is exceptionally small.

Nonetheless, the report underscores the adverse
effects of stigma on individual consumers: “Powerful
and pervasive, stigma prevents people from acknowledging their own mental health problems, much less
disclosing them to others.”

Deinstitutionalization and the
Shift to Community-Based Services
The world of mental health treatment has changed
dramatically in the last half century. In the mid-1950s,
state mental hospital populations peaked at over
500,000 patients and a relatively small percentage of
people were being treated for mental illness in
community-based settings. The succeeding decades
brought remarkable advances in psychopharmacology,
community-based services, and—perhaps most importantly—federal funding, especially through the Medicaid program, all of which contributed to a shift towards
community-based placements and the reduction in state
mental hospital censuses—and, in many cases, the
outright closure of such hospitals. The work of advocates as well as numerous court rulings have also added
to the pressures in favor of deinstitutionalization.
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The changes were rapid and dramatic. In 1955, 77.4
percent of all patient care episodes were attended to in
inpatient settings and 22.6 percent on an outpatient basis.
In 1968, following a substantial expansion of outpatient
services, the percentages had shifted to 47.3 inpatient and
52.7 outpatient. From 1955 to 1970, the census of public
mental hospitals dropped from 558,922 to 337,619, while
admissions rose from 178,003 to 384,511 annually.
(Obviously, length of stay declined sharply over the
period.)14 The report notes that the current inpatient
population has dropped to less than 100,000.
The report puts these developments in an important
historical and social welfare policy context:
The dual policies of community care and
deinstitutionalization . . . were implemented without
evidence of effectiveness of treatments and without a
social welfare system attuned to the needs of hundreds
of thousands of individuals with disabling mental
illness. . . . Many discharged mental patients found
themselves in welfare and criminal justice institutions,
as had their predecessors in earlier eras; some became
homeless or lived in regimented residential (e.g.,
board and care) settings in the community.

One of the primary problems encountered in
deinstitutionalizing the massive number of people who
left the state hospitals, while at the same time preventing the institutionalization of many who would have
been hospitalized under prior policies, was that generic
social welfare programs were ill-prepared to respond to
this new demand. Many social services agencies had
limited experience or expertise in assisting people with
mental illness—and few had large enough budgets to
accommodate a new population needing services.

concern. No one claims to have established any normative figures for how much health care spending ought to
go for mental health.
Yet there is evidence that mental health expenditures
have been brought under rigorous managed care controls to an extent which has not been true of other health
expenditures. This development has raised some concerns about quality. As Mechanic and McAlpine observe:
There are indications that reductions in the intensity of
care may have gone too far. . . . For every day of
reduced [inpatient] stay, the odds of readmission
within sixty days increased by 3.1 percent. . . . For
those with large reductions (ten or more days), the risk
of readmission within sixty days was 37 percent
higher than for patients whose days of care were not
reduced.

Viewed from the context of a single employer, this
policy may indeed be “penny wise and pound foolish,”
in that the savings generated from mental health expenditure reductions may be leading to increases in other
health care spending. From their recent study of a large
corporation that reduced mental health service use as a
result of cost containment efforts, Robert Rosenheck of
the Yale University School of Medicine and his colleagues conclude:
Savings in mental health services were fully offset by
increased use of other services and lost workdays. . . .
Perhaps the most important implication of this study is
that reductions in use of mental health services can be
associated with compensatory increases in use of medical services and may adversely affect the functional and
health status of patients, with no savings to payers . . . .If
reducing mental health care is associated with increased
medical service use and cost, it may be inferred that use
of mental health services prior to these reductions was
restraining such costs.15

As public mental health policy moved toward
community treatment, basic differences between mental
health and other health care became apparent. Mental
health programs for people with severe and persistent
illness necessarily had to encompass an array of services typically thought extraneous to health care,
including housing, income support, protective services,
and, where appropriate, vocational rehabilitation and
other employment services.

These findings only seem to underscore the validity of
the report’s repeated message that mental health and
physical health are inextricably linked.

Mental Health’s Shrinking Portion of the
National Health Care Accounts

Translating Science into Laypeople’s
Language

In recent years, the fraction of national health
expenditures going to mental health has been declining.
The report indicates that between 1986 and 1996, when
health care spending was growing by more than 8
percent, mental health spending grew by about by 1
percent less. This decline is not in itself reason for

Certainly, the basic purpose of the report is educating
the public and the policymaking process about the realities of mental health and mental illness. It accomplishes
this mission primarily by conveying the findings of a large
number of scientific and social scientific studies in
language that is understandable by the lay public.

PURPOSES SERVED BY THE REPORT
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people who just don’t believe that mental illnesses are
real. . . . This report shows the science that says that
the bases of mental illness are chemical changes in the
brain and, therefore, physical changes, changes in the
basic cells of the brain.

To take but a single example, the report addresses the
lack of public understanding of the incapacitating nature
of serious mental illness. It does this first by confirming
that serious mental illnesses are indeed debilitating:
The fact that many, if not most, people have experienced mental health problems that mimic or even
match some of the symptoms of diagnosable mental
disorder tends, ironically, to prompt many people to
underestimate the painful, disabling nature of severe
mental illness. In fact, schizophrenia, mood disorders
such as major depression and bipolar illness, and
anxiety often are devastating conditions.

Satcher’s observations call to mind a controversial
comment about suicide made by Minnesota Governor
Jessie Ventura in an interview published in the November 1999 issue of Playboy:
I’ve seen too many people fight for their lives. I have
no respect for anyone who would kill himself. If
you’re a feeble, weak-minded person to begin with, I
don’t have time for you. . . . I don’t have sympathy is
what my feelings are on suicide. . . . To me it’s something that doesn’t have to happen if people take a
positive attitude on life like I do.

The report goes on to call attention to a study which
compares several psychiatric diagnoses to more familiar
physical diagnoses, using the framework of Disability
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs):
The measure of disease burden used in [the Global
Burden of Disease study], called Disability Adjusted
Life Years (DALYs), allows comparison of the
burden of disease across many different disease
conditions. DALYs account for lost years of healthy
life regardless of whether the years were lost to
premature death or disability. For example, major
depression is equivalent in burden to blindness or
paraplegia, whereas active psychosis seen in schizophrenia is equal in disability burden to quadriplegia.

The report also cites findings with immediate policy
relevance. For example, it reports on a study that found
that 51 percent of older people who committed suicide
saw their physician within a period 30 days prior to
taking their own life. Given the disproportionately high
suicide rate among the elderly—especially older
men—the implication seems obvious: if nonpsychiatric
physicians were trained to identify suicidal indications
among older patients, they might intervene to prevent a
significant number of suicides.

Eradicating Stigma and Popular Biases
At the press conference at which the report was
released, Tipper Gore called mental illness “the last great
stigma of the twentieth century.” The same evening, in a
televised interview with Gwen Ifill of public television’s
“NewsHour with Jim Lehrer,” Satcher elaborated:
That’s our first charge . . . to really see if we can change
the environment so that people feel comfortable. . . . If
a person has a cardiovascular disease or diabetes,
they’re not embarrassed to seek care, but so often in this
country if people have mental illness, they’re embarrassed. Families are embarrassed. You can’t change that
unless you change the level of awareness . . . and change
the attitudes of the American people.
I think one of the reasons there’s so much stigma
surrounding mental illness is . . . there are a lot of

Ventura was apparently unaware when he made this
comment that 90 to 95 percent of suicides are associated
with one of several major mental illnesses—depression,
manic-depressive disorder, schizophrenia, drug and
alcohol abuse, and personality disorders. The report is full
of scientific evidence to counter such attitudes.

Affirming the Efficacy of Treatment
In the executive summary, the report points out:
“Increasingly effective treatments for mental disorders
promise to be the most effective antidote to stigma.” It
then goes on to state two major conclusions:




The efficacy of mental health treatments is well
documented.
A range of treatments exists for most mental disorders.

It would appear that at least some of the reason for
skepticism about the effectiveness of mental health
interventions is attributable to unrealistic attitudes
towards the results produced by somatic—that is, nonpsychiatric—medicine. National Institute of Mental
Health Director Steven Hyman and his associate
Grayson Norquist commented in a recent Health Affairs
article:
From a policy perspective, the decision to provide services often comes down to perceived use of limited
resources to provide care for those illnesses that have
the greatest impact on public health. Yet it is interesting to note that in general medicine there is no lack of
coverage for illnesses that have only temporary and
mild disability and no effective treatments (such as
viral upper respiratory tract infections) or for which
treatments have low efficacy (such as pancreatic
cancer). In many cases, diagnosable, highly disabling,
and highly treatable mental disorders have received
far fewer resources.16
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In a similar vein, the report comments:
The thresholds of mental illness have . . . been set by
convention, but the fact is that this gray zone is no
different from any other area of medicine. Ten years
ago, a serum cholesterol of 200 was considered
normal. Today, the same number alarms some physicians and may lead to treatment. Perhaps every adult
in the United States has some atherosclerosis [arterial
occlusion, popularly called “hardening of the arteries”], but at what point does this move along a continuum from normal into the realm of illness? Ultimately, the dividing line has to do with severity of
symptoms, duration, and functional impairment.

When it comes to diagnostic categories as opposed
to thresholds, however, the report is even less ambiguous: “Diagnoses of mental disorders made using
specific criteria are as reliable as those for general
medical disorders.” It describes the DSM-IV (the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition), published by the American Psychiatric
Association and used across the country as the diagnostic system for mental illness, as “a unique approach to
diagnosis by a professional field” and goes on to point
out: “No other sphere of health care has created such an
extensive compendium of all of its disorders with
explicit diagnostic criteria.”
At least part of the misunderstanding here may be
linked to a conflation or confusion of acute and chronic
conditions. Even with chronic somatic conditions, there
is generally little hope for cure; often, the best that can
be hoped for is maintenance—that is, preventing further
deterioration. As noted above, many serious mental
disorders are chronic. The report injects a note of
realism in this regard:
Although psychiatric therapies can alleviate symptoms
and permit individuals to live in the community, there
is no “magic bullet” that will cure all cases of serious
mental illness. Like cardiovascular, renal, and other
chronic degenerative disorders, serious mental disorders require both therapy and management.

Just as medical science gives us little guidance on how
to prevent chronic physical disease, it also sheds little
light on how to prevent mental illness—especially chronic
mental illness. Part of the reason is that we have been able
to learn remarkably little about the etiology or origins of
chronic illness in either the physical or mental health
arenas. The report frankly concedes this limitation:
In the mental health field, progress in developing
preventive interventions has been slow because, for
most major mental disorders, there is insufficient
understanding about etiology . . . and/or there is an
inability to alter the known etiology of a particular
disorder.

Emphasizing the Importance of
Culturally Competent Services
The failure of mental health interventions to take into
consideration the unique features of all major ethnic and
racial minorities, including African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and American Indians, is one of
the major findings of the report: “The U.S. mental health
system is not well equipped to meet the needs of racial
and ethnic minority populations. Racial and ethnic
minority groups are generally considered to be underserved by the mental health services system.”
To remedy this, the report recommends a goal of
“cultural competence,” which it defines as follows:
To be culturally competent is to deliver treatment that is
equally effective to all sociocultural groups. The treatments provided must not only be efficacious (based on
clinical research), but also effective in community
delivery. The delivery of effective treatments is complicated because most research on efficacy has been
conducted on predominantly white populations.

Cultural competence is of special importance in
mental health for a number of reasons, but one stands out.
A disproportionate number of minority group members
have household incomes below the federal poverty
threshold. This means that they are at special risk both in
terms of developing a mental disorder—people in the
lowest socioeconomic strata are about two and one-half
times more likely than those in the highest strata to have
such a disorder—and in terms of experiencing difficulty
in getting access to any treatment for that disorder.
To cite but a few examples, the report notes the
following special characteristics of minority groups that
need to be considered:







One of the common idioms of distress is somatization, the expression of mental distress in terms of
physical suffering. . . . Epidemiological studies have
confirmed that there are relatively high rates of
somatization among African Americans.
Among Mexican-Americans and Asian Americans,
relatively high rates of marriage and low rates of
divorce, along with a greater tendency to live in extended family households, indicate an orientation
toward family.
Immigrant families with relatives who may be
undocumented . . . are less likely to trust authorities
for fear of being reported and having the family
member deported.

The report also draws attention to the emerging body
of research on ethnopsychopharmacology, a field which
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investigates genetic and psychosocial differences which
influence the effectiveness of courses of mental health
pharmaceutical therapies among different racial and
ethnic groups. With regard to psychosocial differences,
the report points out that language barriers and other
communications problems may hinder proper compliance with prescribed dosing. With respect to genetic
differences, it notes:
There is wide racial and ethnic variation in drug metabolism . . . due to genetic variations in drug-metabolizing
enzymes (which are responsible for breaking down
drugs in the liver). . . . Since most of the ethnic variation
comes in the form of inactivation or reduction in activity
in the enzymes, the result is higher amounts of medication in the blood, triggering untoward side effects. For
example, 33 percent of African Americans and 37
percent of Asians are slow metabolizers of several
antipsychotic medications and antidepressants.

Establishing an Agenda for Future Action
In addition to addressing the areas of public education, stigma, communicating about effective treatments,
and cultural competence just discussed, the report
establishes five more agenda items for future action:









Continue to build the science base—The report
emphasizes the importance of “research that explores approaches for reducing risk factors and
strengthening protective factors for the prevention of
mental illness,” important areas where the knowledge base is limited.
Ensure the supply of mental health services and
providers—Among the critical areas experiencing
professional personnel shortages are services to
children and adolescents as well as older people
with serious mental illnesses. In addition, more
specialists with expertise in cognitive-behavioral
therapy and interpersonal therapy—two forms of
psychotherapy of proven effectiveness for severe
mental disorders—are urgently needed.
Ensure delivery of state-of-the-art treatments—
Despite the established knowledge base about effective, community-based services, the report indicates
that there is a pronounced gap between research and
practice in many communities.
Facilitate entry into treatment—The report speaks
of the obligation of public and private agencies to
facilitate entry into mental health care and treatment
through the multiple “portals of entry,” including
primary health care, schools, and the child welfare
system. It also voices concern about the “alarming
number of children and adults with mental illness

[who] are in the criminal justice system inappropriately.”



Reduce financial barriers to treatment—While
expressing general concern about the degree to
which financial barriers impede access to needed
treatment for mental illness, the report also declares
without qualification: “Equality between mental
health coverage and other health coverage—a
concept known as parity—is an affordable and
effective objective.”

USING THE REPORT IN A PUBLIC
POLICY CONTEXT
In essence, the report offers policymakers a compendium of policy-relevant research to guide their decision
making about coverage of mental health services. For
the most part, it assiduously avoids making explicit
policy recommendations, although many of the research
findings it features all but seem to point in certain
directions. As many observed when the report was
released, its effects on policy will depend very much on
the uses of which policymakers and advocates choose
to make it.
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